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Abstract—To prevent password breaches and guessing attacks,
banks increasingly turn to two-factor authentication (2FA), re-
quiring users to present at least one more factor, such as a
one-time password generated by a hardware token or received
via SMS, besides a password. We can expect some solutions –
especially those adding a token – to create extra work for users,
but little research has investigated usability, user acceptance,
and perceived security of deployed 2FA. This paper presents
an in-depth study of 2FA usability with 21 UK online banking
customers, 16 of whom had accounts with more than one
bank. We collected a rich set of qualitative and quantitative
data through two rounds of semi-structured interviews, and an
authentication diary over an average of 11 days. Our participants
reported a wide range of usability issues, especially with the
use of hardware tokens, showing that the mental and physical
workload involved shapes how they use online banking. Key
targets for improvements are (i) the reduction in the number
of authentication steps, and (ii) removing features that do not
add any security but negatively affect the user experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online banking provides users with anywhere-anytime ac-
cess to financial services, enabling customers to check their
balance and their recent transactions, pay bills, or issue bank
transfers, without having to visit a bank branch. Over the past
decade, an increasing number of banks worldwide began to
support online banking, with consequent fast-growing adop-
tion rates. In 2013, it was estimated that 42% of EU and 51%
of US customers use online banking – a remarkable increase
from five years earlier [8], [9].
Naturally, remote access to financial services prompts the
need for strong security guarantees, including strong authenti-
cation. To toughen the security of password-based authentica-
tion, online banking operators increasingly turn to two-factor
authentication (2FA), requiring users to provide one or more
additional authentication factors – such as a one-time passcode
generated by a hardware token or received via SMS – besides
their password. In recent years, regulation of several countries
has started to mandate its use in the financial sector, though
in different forms [5], [6].
The need for an extra authentication factor often imposes
additional burden onto the users, as 2FA might require them
to carry additional devices with them, increase the time
needed to authenticate as well as the number of mistakes and
lockouts. As shown in prior work [1], since security is not the
primary task, users are often frustrated by complex authenti-
cation tasks. For instance, enforcing long passwords, frequent
changes, and preventing re-use across accounts, often drives
them to find the simplest password that barely complies with
the requirements [1]. Also, imposing lengthy authentication
tasks often takes a toll on productivity [17] and causes severe
disruption to the user [12]. Nonetheless, little research has
focused on studying (or improving) the usability of 2FA, thus
motivating the need to elicit and analyse insight on issues
faced by regular users as well as their coping strategies.
Overview. In this paper, we present an in-depth study of 2FA
usability in the context of UK online banking (N = 21). We
focus on banking as it represents one of 2FA’s most popular
contexts of use, and recruit actual customers that have been
using 2FA. We conduct two series of face-to-face interviews
and ask participants to maintain an authentication diary (over
an average of 11 days). We analyse data both qualitatively and
quantitatively and uncover a wide range of issues experienced
by users – in particular, with the use of hardware tokens. We
find that participants’ satisfaction is negatively correlated with
the use of hardware tokens as well as the need to provide
multiple credentials. The demands placed on users, such as
the need to produce and remember a wide range of different
credentials (often with confusing nomenclature), carrying and
operating extra devices, are quite disruptive to their primary
task, and shape how often, from where, and how, customers
use online banking. For instance, one participant even switched
banks to avoid using a hardware token.
Contributions. Our study derives important insight on actual
authentication interactions, as we interview actual users of 2FA
and online banking—unlike prior work, where study partici-
pants only performed artificial tasks on mock-up prototypes
(cf. Section II). By analysing the data collected from semi-
structured interviews (Section V) and authentication diaries
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(Section VI), we shed light on struggles and misconceptions
experienced by users. Our work provides an exploratory anal-
ysis of these issues and paves the way for further research, in-
cluding larger hypothesis-driven studies as well cross-analysis
of qualitative and empirical data measuring authentication
tasks’ completion time, mistakes, lockouts, stress and frustra-
tion. As discussed in Section VII, we highlight a few action-
able items for online banking operators, as we highlight the
need to reduce the number of authentication steps, minimise
confusion, as well as to remove features that do not add any
real security but negatively affect user experience.
II. RELATED WORK
We now review prior work on 2FA usability and online
banking.
2FA usability. Braz et al. [4] were among the first to inves-
tigate the usability of 2FA and suggested that, by increasing
redundancy, 2FA strengthens security but reduces usability.
However, they did not conduct any actual user study. Strouble
et al. [17] analysed the effect on productivity of the Common
Access Card (CAC), a smart card and photo ID used by US
Department of Defense employees. They found that employees
were often locked out as they left the card in the reader and
almost stopped answering emails from home, concluding that
the DoD lost more than $10M worth of time. Gunson et
al. [10] investigated authentication usability in the context of
automated telephone banking, asking 62 participants to rate
their experience via a 22-item questionnaire: when second
factors of authentication were enforced, users felt more secure
than when using only passwords or PINs, but at the expense
of usability.
Bonneau et al. [2] evaluated several password-replacement
schemes, and compared security and usability of passwords,
OAuth and OpenID [15], hardware and phone-based tokens.
They did not conduct a user study, but relied on a set of
25 subjective metrics, eight of which intended to capture
usability, concluding that 2FA is more secure but less usable
than passwords.
Comparative studies of 2FA. While studies above compared
2FA with simple password-based authentication, another line
of work presented comparative studies within 2FA. Weir
et al. [18] investigated usability perceptions of three 2FA
technologies (a push-button token, a card-activated token,
and a PIN-activated token). They asked 50 participants to
use each option, identify what they liked/disliked, how they
would improve the technologies, and answer a short usability
questionnaire. Users were then asked to authenticate again
with their preferred technology and fill out the usability
questionnaire once more. Authors found a strong correlation
between preference and perceived convenience, but only a
weak correlation between perceived security and perceived
convenience/usability. In a follow-up study, Weir et al. [19]
compared the usability of password authentication and two
2FA technologies, specifically, one-time passwords generated
by a token or received via SMS. They performed a lab
study involving 141 participants and a 30-question survey,
and concluded that familiarity with a technology – rather
than perceived usability – affected user willingness to use that
technology. The participants in Weir et al.’s studies interacted
with prototypes, performing artificial tasks – they did not log
in to their own accounts and they were not interacting with
the authentication interface under real-life constraints (e.g.,
time pressure). In contrast, we interview actual users of online
banking services and collect data on actual interactions, thus
deriving important insight on problems faced by regular users
as well as on their coping strategies.
De Cristofaro et al. [7] presented an exploratory quantita-
tive analysis comparing the usability of three different 2FA
technologies, based on a survey completed by 219 US users
recruited on Mechanical Turk. They found that users were
relatively pleased with 2FA usability, regardless of the specific
technology, and regardless of motivations or context of use.
However, the perceived usability was somewhat correlated
with demographics—e.g., female and older people felt they
expended more cognitive effort to use 2FA. Also, in contrast to
previous studies, users’ perception of trustworthiness was not
negatively correlated with ease of use and required cognitive
efforts. Compared to [7], our study does not aim to quantita-
tively compare across technology and does not rely on surveys,
rather, it provides an in-depth analysis focused on struggles
and misconceptions experienced by actual 2FA/online banking
users. We do so by means of semi-structured interviews, which
provide a flexible way of exploring the user’s perspective –
especially in the context of banking authentication, where it
is hard to obtain empirical data from the system owners (such
as number of failed logins and password resets) who regard
the information as commercially sensitive. Also note that
the online banking 2FA landscape in the US is significantly
different from the one in UK, as the majority of US banks
(at least at the time research in [7] was conducted) only
implemented dual credentials, but not 2FA.
Online banking. Just and Aspinall [13] analysed the use
of dual credential authentication for online banking from
both security and usability points of view. They considered
granularity and time of feedback given to users during the
authentication steps as main usability properties, and found
that some banks delayed feedback by not providing it at
screen change, or provided granular feedback too late in the
authentication process. They concluded that these issues are
likely to confuse users, but did not conduct an actual user
study. Our work complements [13] as we conduct an in-
depth user study aiming to understand authentication for online
banking from the users’ point of view. Also, while [13] looked
at dual credentials (e.g., two passwords, two PINs, or two
challenge questions), we focus on actual 2FA.
Authentication diaries. Other studies have also used authenti-
cation diaries to understand authentication habits and usability
issues. Inglesant and Sasse [12] introduced password diaries
to capture the details of authentication events happening in the
wild and found that frequent password changes are perceived
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Bank Identification Pre-assigned? Type
Barclays Surname + [Membership, Assigned (Varies)
Card, or Account No]
Halifax, User ID Assigned but 9+ letters
Lloyds changeable and/or digits
HSBC, User ID Chosen 5+ letters
First Direct and digits
Nationwide Customer Number Assigned 10 digits
NatWest, RBS, Customer Number (DoB Assigned 10 digits
Ulster ddmmyy + 4 digits)
Santander Personal ID Assigned 5+ digits
The Co-op Bank Account No or Assigned (Varies)
Credit Card No
TABLE I: Identification mechanisms for online banking with differ-
ent UK banks.
as troublesome, that users do not change passwords unless
forced to, and that it is difficult for them to create memorable
passwords adhering to the policy. Hayashi and Hong [11]
also analysed two-week diaries to derive the average number
of passwords, frequency of use, recall strategies, etc., across
users. Finally, Steves et al. [16] asked 23 employees of
a US government organisation to keep a diary for every
authentication event in one day, and later interviewed them
on their authentication experience: the study highlights users’
frustration with authentication processes that disrupt their
primary task and hinder their productivity, and uncovers a
number of coping strategies aimed to minimise the negative
impact of security on employees’ work. Authors also found
that the requirement to use 2FA in the form of a SecureID
token made employees log in remotely less often than they
would normally do.
Summary. Prior work on 2FA usability presented expert
assessments, survey-based studies, and experiments on proto-
types, incurring a number of shortcomings. Expert assessments
did not involve users, yielding findings that only rely on
researchers’ judgement and often without the benefit of a
structured usability assessment technique, such as GOMS,
heuristic evaluation or cognitive walkthrough [14]. Survey-
based studies asked participants to make hypothetical choices
or report behaviours based on what they can remember. Fi-
nally, studies with prototypes were performed in the absence of
real-life constraints: without reference to a primary task – such
as paying a bill - or context of use - paying a bill from your
office during lunch break or in a hotel room while traveling.
This highlights the lack of studies focused on actual users of
2FA and online banking, which is crucial to understanding how
customers use 2FA different technologies for online banking
and how these fit into their every-day activities.
III. BACKGROUND
This section summarises the two-factor authentication (2FA)
landscape for online and mobile banking in the United
Kingdom. All information provided is as of summer 2014.
We overview authentication mechanisms for login purposes,
setting up new payees, and using mobile banking functionality
for 11 popular UK banks: Barclays, Co-operative, First Direct,
Bank 1st Factor 2nd Factor
Barclays-1 8-digit OTP (PINsentry –
or Mobile PINsentry)
Barclays-2 5-digit passcode 2 of 8+ characters
memorable word
Halifax, 8+ character password 3 of 6+ characters
Lloyds memorable information
HSBC, memorable answer 6-digit OTP (Secure Key
First Direct or Digital Secure Key)
Nationwide-1 memorable data 3 of 6 digits passnumber
Nationwide-2 8-digit OTP (card reader) –
NatWest, RBS, 3 of 4-digit PIN 3 of 6+ characters
Ulster password
Santander-1 6+ character 5-digit registration
password number
Santander-2 3 of 6+ character 3 of 5-digit registration
password number
TABLE II: Authentication mechanisms for online banking with
different UK banks.
Halifax, HSBC, Lloyds, Nationwide, NatWest, RBS, San-
tander, Ulster. We focus on these banks as (i) all participants
in our study have an account with at least one of them, and
(ii) they cover the vast majority of the UK market.
All 11 banks in our sample follow a two-step authentication
process to login on the online banking websites. In the first
step, users provide an identifier and, only with Lloyds/Halifax,
one authentication factor. Then, if the first step is successful,
they are asked to authenticate by providing two authentication
factors (one with Halifax and Lloyds). In Table I and II,
we summarise respectively, the different identification and
authentication mechanisms used by different UK banks, using
banks’ original terminology.
During the identification step, banks usually provide users
with a remember me option: if selected, users do not have to
re-enter their identifier when logging in from the same device
and browser, unless they clear the cookies. Also note that, in
the second step, some banks display to the user a previously
selected picture and/or text, aiming to provide some visual
confirmation that the user is not on a phishing site.
Many of the banks rely on hardware tokens to generate the
second authentication factor, specifically, one-time passwords
(OTPs). Some devices require the user to insert their “chip-
and-PIN” debit card and enter the card’s PIN (e.g., Barclay’s
PINsentry or NatWest’s Card-Reader), while with other de-
vices (HSBC and First Direct’s Secure Key) users only need
to enter a previously selected PIN. Figure 1 presents three
examples of hardware tokens used by popular UK banks.
When setting up a new payment (e.g., to pay a bill or issue
a money transfer to an account that has never paid into), all
banks require an additional authentication step (besides those
needed for login). Most banks require a one-time password
(OTP) authenticating the specific transaction, amount, and/or
payee (depending on the bank). In Table III, we report the
different technologies used to generate OTPs across different
banks. In the rightmost column, we also introduce some labels
to categorise each type of technology.
All banks in our sample also support mobile banking, via
smartphone apps (on iPhone and Android), allowing their
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(a) Secure Key
(HSBC)
(b) PINsentry
(Barclays)
(c) Card-Reader
(NatWest)
Fig. 1: Examples of three hardware tokens, i.e., devices generating
one-time passwords (OTPs) for authentication purposes.
OTP Source Bank Category
Secure Key HSBC, First Direct SK
Card reader Barclays, Nationwide, NatWest, CR
RBS, Ulster
SMS Santander SMS
Mobile phone app Barclays, HSBC, First Direct M
Phone call Lloyds, Halifax P
TABLE III: Technologies used to generate OTPs for different UK
banks. Rightmost column introduces labels, used throughout the
paper, to indicate each type of technology.
customers to check their balance and issue payments. In
Table IV, we report the authentication mechanisms enforced
by each bank’s app. (We do not report on payment/transaction
authentication, but only app login).
IV. STUDY DESIGN
We now present the methodology and the design of our
study, consisting of three stages: preliminary open-ended in-
terviews, authentication diaries, and final follow-up interviews.
A. Methodology
Recruitment. The research was conducted in August 2014 and
framed as a user study on online banking. Participants were
recruited through social media and from a research participant
pool at our university. Interested users were invited to complete
a short pre-screening survey, aiming to assess their eligibility
to participate. We collected basic demographic information
(age, gender, level of education) and asked potential partici-
pants whether or not they had previously used online banking
and with which banks. Out of 66 people who responded, we
selected 21 participants as described below.
Sampling and participant demographics. In order to select
a representative sample, we divided potential participants
into five groups, one for each category of OTP generator,
that is: Secure Key, card reader, one-time password (OTP)
delivered via SMS, OTP generated by a smartphone app, and
phone-based authentication. All answers given by users were
Bank ID always Authentication Factor(s)
required?
Barclays No 5-digit PIN
Halifax, No 3 characters of
Lloyds memorable information
HSBC, Yes Memorable answer + 3
First Direct No characters of a password
Nationwide No 3 of 6-digit passnumber
NatWest No 5-8 digit PIN
RBS No 5-8 digit PIN
Santander Yes 3 characters of password,
3 digits of security number
Ulster No 5-8 digit PIN
TABLE IV: Authentication for mobile apps with different UK banks.
checked for plausibility and cross-referenced later during the
interviews. We selected participants to achieve a gender/age
balance within each category.
Our final sample consisted of 11 female and 10 male
participants. Mean age was 32.4 (range: 19-69, SD = 10.87).
Out of the 21 participants, 10 of them had a postgraduate
degree (a Masters or a PhD), 7 an undergraduate degree, 2
had A-Levels (UK school leaving certification), 1 had some
undergraduate education with no completed degree, and 1
participant had completed vocational training. A total of 5
participants had an account with one bank, 14 with two
banks, and 2 with three banks. Also, 8 were customers of
HSBC, 6 of Barclays, 6 of NatWest, 5 of Santander, 4 of
Lloyds, 3 of Halifax, and 2 of RBS. First Direct, Nationwide,
the Co-operative Bank, Ulster Bank, and Citigroup all had
one customer each. Finally, 43% of participants used Secure
Key, 76% card readers, 24% OTP via SMS, 14% OTP via
smartphone app, and 21% authentication through a phone call.
Ethics. The study design and protocol, along with all materials
we used, was reviewed and approved by UCL’s Research
Ethics Committee (approval number: 6010/001). Note that we
did not collect any personally identifiable information, such
as login information or bank details. We temporarily stored
participants’ demographic and contact information, authenti-
cation diaries, and interview recordings for the duration of
the analysis. Both electronic data and diaries were securely
disposed of at the end of the study.
B. Study stages
Preliminary interviews. The first stage of the study consisted
of semi-structured interviews, conducted in a lab setting with
one researcher and one participant at a time. Interviews lasted
30 minutes on average, and involved a total of 21 participants.
The goal of these interviews was twofold: (1) eliciting a
better understanding of banking preferences (e.g., “online”
vs. “offline”), attitudes towards online banking, frequency
of use of online and mobile banking services, and (2) ex-
ploring attitudes towards authentication technologies deployed
by the banks, aiming to identify sources of common errors,
misconceptions, and frustration. Interviews were structured
around a basic set of open-ended questions allowing users to
talk about their authentication habits and experience. When
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needed, the researcher followed up on a topic of interest
raised by the participant with further questions (e.g., when one
participant identified some part of the authentication process as
unnecessarily difficult or unjustifiable). At the end, participants
were introduced to, and briefed on, the next stage – the diary
study and received £5 for their participation.
Authentication diaries. We asked participants to maintain an
banking authentication diary over a 10–12 day period starting
immediately after the interviews. They each received a 20-
page booklet (one page for one authentication event). There,
participants were asked to write down date/time of the authen-
tication event, name of the bank, the location and the device
from where they authenticated, what authentication factor(s)
they used, and their reason to authenticate, following some
pre-filled fields. Also, they could report on any problems they
encountered (and if/how they were solved), they were asked
to give a rating of their satisfaction with the authentication
process and finally, there was space for any other comments.
Final interviews. The last stage of the study involved 17
participants (80% of our initial sample), as four participants
were unavailable to come for an interview within our set time
frame. Once again, we conducted semi-structured interviews
– lasting 30 minutes on average – in a lab setting with one
researcher and one participant at a time. We started with a
debrief of the diary entries, asking participants to comment
on the experience of keeping an authentication diary, on their
authentication routine, and to comment on some of their diary
entries. Next, we asked them to talk about other authentication
systems they were familiar with, besides the context of online
banking, placing more emphasis on systems that they enjoy
interacting with, allowing participants to convey what elements
they consider vital for a successful authentication process.
Finally, we explored participants’ perceptions regarding the
notion of implicit authentication by explaining the concept and
giving examples of how such a system would work. At the end
of the session, participants received £10 for their participation
in this final part of the study.
V. INTERVIEW RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of a thematic analy-
sis [3] conducted on both sets of interviews (preliminary and
final interviews) by one researcher. The next section will then
analyse the authentication diaries.
A. Struggling with hardware tokens
One of the most problematic issues highlighted by partici-
pants was undoubtedly related to hardware tokens, i.e., devices
used to generate one-time passwords (OTPs), such as HSBC’s
Secure Key, Barclays’ PINsentry, NatWest’s Card-Reader (see
Figure 1).
When talking about their experience with hardware tokens,
participants discussed both what they perceived as advantages
and disadvantages (e.g., compared to other 2FA forms), with
negative feedback being predominant. Only four out of 20
participants found that the hardware token was “easy to
use”, “portable”, or “easy to incorporate into everyday life.”
Whereas, seven participants complained that they have to
remember to bring it with them, while four found the use of
a hardware token to be frustrating. Some found it superfluous
(2 mentions), unconvincing (2), not thought-through (2), and
five of them questioned the necessity of introducing it. We
singled out one participant, P19 (SK,CR)1, whose insight
somewhat summarises the view of other participants as well:
“I don’t think it was really thought-through. I kind
of wonder who they consulted in the beginning. [. . . ]
It’s impractical to be constantly having that on you
because if you lost your bag/keys/purse it would be
very difficult to then log on or ask for another one.
[. . . ] It feels a bit long-winded at times, especially if
I am in a rush or I forgot that I had to pay someone.
So I find myself in the situation where I often have
to order new card readers because I always tend to
lose them and then find them. At the moment I am
trying to keep one in my bag and one at home. I’ve
probably have about 10 or something because I keep
losing them and finding them.”
Other participants felt that their account was secure enough
before the introduction of the hardware token, as they had
never experienced any fraud and/or felt that their password
was hard to guess anyway. P19 (SK,CR) found the online
banking authentication procedures to be excessive compared
to offline transactions where only a four-digit PIN is needed to
authorise a card payment (and, actually, no PIN is required for
contactless payments under £20). Participants often disliked
the extra step that the use of the hardware token introduced
to their authentication task and found it irritating (3) or
inconvenient (5). This seemed to be tied in with the fact that
only 1 out of these 8 participants reported using the hardware
token to issue bank transfers, which probably contributed to
the feeling of superfluousness.
Five participants stressed they thought a particular bank was
more secure because it required using hardware token more
often (e.g., not only for payment setup but also for login). Four
participants (including two from the previous category) said
they preferred a bank that used the token less, or did not use
it at all. In fact, three participants reported changing banks
or logging into their account less frequently because of the
hardware token. P19 (SK,CR) said:
“Initially, I had an account with HSBC [. . . ] and
that was before they brought in the horrible key
ring thing that you have to carry with you at all
times to log in [. . . ]. With NatWest you have to
remember passwords and stuff but you don’t have
to bring anything physically with you unless you’re
changing like payments and transfers [. . . ] That’s
why I’m with NatWest, just because I find their
online banking system [. . . ] compared to HSBC, it’s
the most simple.”
1 For each participant we quote, we also indicate, in brackets, the OTP
generation technology they use, as per Table III.
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P19 (SK,CR) was also ironic as to why the token was
introduced in the first place:
“I’ve been using Internet 15 years now, and I’ve
used it for a long time. I think people older than
me should be using it as well and kind of be more
afraid of it. . . and been told by their banks online
banking is more convenient but then found the whole
process not really secure. So I think it was about
trust issues. It was the idea of having something
more tangible similar to the machines in branch or
a cash machine.”
P11 (CR,P) reported that they stopped checking their bal-
ance and recent transaction while at work, since the login pro-
cedure makes it obvious to co-workers they are not working:
“It’s OK when I am at home, but when you are
at work and you are pretending you are actually
doing work when you are actually checking on your
account, then you have to bring out this calculator
thing and it’s kind of obvious you are not doing
work. I’d rather have something where I am just on
the screen and it’s lot quicker.”
B. Struggling with credentials
Authentication terminology. Another important issue relates
to confusing terminology used inconsistently across different
banks. For instance, P08 (CR,SMS,M) reported:
“Is it a passphrase or passcode or key phrase what
they need? [chuckling] I think it is slightly confusing.
Although I’m experienced [. . . ], it’s frustrating.”
In fact, there is an astonishing number of different terms
used to denote a few different forms of credentials: mem-
bership number, customer number, username, user ID; pass-
word, passcode, passphrase; memorable word, memorable
answer, memorable information etc. (cf. Table I and II).
As a result, participants complained they not only had to
remember the actual credentials but also what they are called.
P18 (SK,CR,SMS) stated:
“One of them was called a ‘passcode’ and the other
one was ‘ID’, and I never knew which one is which
and actually. For the cases I forgot them, it was very
confusing for me because when I was to recover my
credentials it was difficult to know which I forgot!”
Providing selected characters. Participants reported a few
coping strategies when asked to enter selected characters from
their credentials (e.g., the third and the sixth letter), including
repeating the password (or memorable word) in their head,
whispering it, counting letters on their fingers, or writing it
down and counting letters on paper.
Several banks even ask for the characters to be entered out
of order, which makes the process significantly harder. For
P17 (CR,M,P) providing characters out of order meant more
effort and time:
“If I don’t even bother to remember the password,
I will first have to look for it, then do the math. . . I
mean it’s not that difficult but “Oh! This one is the
5th letter”, I repeat it multiple times in my head.”
Also, the methods of entering the characters seemed to matter
to our participants. P11 (CR,P) stated:
“Actually when you are accessing it from a PC it is
a box, when you access it from a mobile phone it’s
a drop down list. I prefer the box, it’s just easier. I
don’t have to scroll up and down and try to find it.”
We looked more closely at the use of drop-down lists,
such as those used by Barclays (both on the desktop and
mobile devices) to let users enter selected characters of their
“memorable word.” We initially assumed their purpose was to
reduce the risks of key-loggers installed on the user’s device.
However, with the exception of some versions of Internet
Explorer, one can still type the corresponding characters from
the keyboard (i.e., upon pressing a key, the correct character
from the drop-down list is selected), thus users are actually
still vulnerable. Also note that the characters are not hidden
once they are selected from the menu, which makes them more
vulnerable to shoulder surfing.
Memorable answer. Beside usernames and passwords, cus-
tomers of UK banks are asked to provide a “memorable
answer” (e.g., to a question like “What was the name of your
first pet?”). In general, participants did not report problems
providing their memorable answers but three of them said they
were often unsure how they had spelled them. P15 (SK,P)
also complained that one of their banks was asking for their
memorable answer but did not say what the question was:
“HSBC gives you prompts for the memorable in-
formation. The Lloyds one just asks you to enter
the memorable information but it doesn’t give you
prompts about what it was.”
Three participants were concerned with the fact that their
answers were easily guessable by their relatives and friends.
They questioned how memorable answers actually added se-
curity to their account. P17 (CR,M,P) reported:
“This information is everywhere [. . . ] It’s just a
waste of authentication, and a waste of time.”
Assigned usernames. The majority of UK banks assign
usernames (that cannot be changed) – which often makes it
harder for users to remember them. Participants in our studies
reported two main coping strategies: eight of them said they
were writing their usernames down, while seven had their
browsers remember them. Five participants reported that not
being able to remember their usernames prevented them from
logging in from other computers than their own. P02 (SK,CR)
stated:
“For NatWest and HSBC, if I go somewhere else and
I use another computer [. . . ] then I cannot remember
it and I cannot even get through the first step.”
Participants also stressed they found their username to be
an unrelatable string of numbers, unlike their usernames for
other services which they were able to pick themselves.
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Passwords. When asked to create a password, three partici-
pants stated they reused an existing password and nine that
they partially reused it. P07 (CR,P) said:
“I use one password for everything, and I vary it a
bit I add a number an exclamation mark, a hashtag,
but the core password is the same for all websites.”
Seven participants said they created participants to be highly
memorable (to facilitate their recall) and other seven reported
writing their passwords down. P21 (SK,SMS) struggled with
creating a valid password for their bank since the instructions
(describing length and type of characters) did not match what
the system actually accepted, driving P21 to use a trial-and-
error strategy in order to generate an acceptable password.
Credential recovery. Five participants told us they had to
reset their credentials at some point, describing the process as
cumbersome. P12 (CR) reported:
“You have a number of times you can repeat the
process before they lock you out. And then you have
to phone them up and go through the whole thing
and get them to reset it and it takes 24 hours. So you
need to be very very careful [. . . ] And I always get
a bit nervous – the last thing you want to do is be
locked out from your account. It’s really frustrating
as well because you could mistype m instead of n.”
Participants that went through this process reported they
started to choose easier-to-remember credentials and to focus
more during logins to prevent mistakes. P11 (CR,P) said they
“learned” from their experience:
“It’s quite a big deal afterwards. To reset the whole
thing, you have to call them and they have to verify
things. . . I chose easier information so that I am sure
I will remember it and not have to go through the
process again.”
C. Mental models of authentication tokens
During both interviews, three participants were particularly
intrigued by their hardware token and they made speculations
on how it was operating.
Where do the codes come from? Three participants were
curious about how card readers generated codes that were
accepted by the website and wondered if it was connected to
the Internet. A participant thought that the bank and the token
have a list of codes and as soon as the customer uses one
of them, it gets “crossed out” from the list. This belief could
have been influenced by the fact that banking authentication
in some European countries used to rely on this system. In
fact, P10 (CR,M,P) mentioned having used this system back
when they lived in Germany:
“I used to live in Germany, I really liked the way
they do it there, my bank there was Deutsche Bank. It
gives slips of paper where you have OTPs which are
easy to replicate. . . For me, it’s convenient to have
both in the office and at home. It feels safe even if
someone sees it because even if they see the code,
they wouldn’t know which one they would be using.”
Do I need to protect the token? Two participants told us the
token was valuable and some stated they were protective of
it hiding it out of plain sight. P11 (CR,P) was worried about
what kind of information related to their account could be
collected from the card reader if stolen:
“With regards to this device, I mean, it’s meant to be
secure I would imagine, because you are supposed
to be the only person that should have possession
of it. But if you lose it what happens? What kind of
information can be taken off it? . . . You know relating
to your account, I am not quite sure how secure that
is to be honest.”
In some of the interviews, it became apparent that partic-
ipants did not realise the card readers were interchangeable
between banks. When asked if it would be possible to use a
card reader from one bank to log in to another (which is the
case for several banks), P07 (CR,P) expressed doubts:
“Well, Nationwide sent it to me so I assume it’s
unique for Nationwide, I don’t think I can use it
for other banks. [. . . ] I think the number is unique
for the debit card and the PIN, so if someone stole
the reader they can’t access the reader, they need to
slot in the credit card. It’s to make sure no one else
has access to my account. To get the number, it has
to be my debit card and they have to know my PIN
– so it is very unlikely. . . unless they have the credit
card the PIN and the reader.”
We also encountered another misconception regarding authen-
tication, as P12 (CR) commented on how authentication in the
morning is faster than in the evening:
“I think the process itself can be quite slow. I think
this is because a the server is quite busy and because
they don’t have enough staff to check this kind of
stuff and that can be a problem. Especially in the
evenings it seems to take longer. One day I was at
home, I wanted to pay council tax 10 in the morn-
ing and it went through so fast. It was incredible.
Whereas in the evening there’s more people on and
maybe they don’t have a lot of staff at the other end
checking this stuff and so this takes longer and if
you are in a rush this can be frustrating.”
After a couple of clarifying questions from the interviewer,
it became apparent that the participant thought verification of
credentials happens manually with members of staff checking
the usernames, passwords, memorable answers, and OTPs
customers enter online are correct.
Rituals that make users feel secure. Throughout the in-
terviews, participants reported on their strategies for staying
secure while banking. P07 (CR,P) elaborated what made them
secure:
“There is always a small chance, of a virus or people
can steal your bank account details. That’s always a
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small concern and I do as much I can to prevent that.
On Windows you can have a firewall, I have Avast
Antivirus, they do regular virus definition checks. I
have a password, it’s not an easy password and it’s
also memorable information. I change them every
6 months and if I log in from a friend’s computer
or a library computer, I don’t ask the computer to
remember my username. I don’t do that.”
D. Motivation for online banking
During the first interviews, we asked participants to discuss
their preferred ways of banking. Out of the 21 participants, 17
reported they preferred online banking, with 11 participants
appreciating its convenience, six its ease of use, and seven
the fact that online banking is less time-consuming than other
forms of banking. Obviously, this strong preference might
be correlated to the fact that we recruited participants for
an online banking study. Participants also highlighted several
reasons why they prefer not to go to bank branches, including
long queues and/or distance to the nearest branch, whereas,
four of them reported preferring in-person banking due to
faster/better resolution of queries and having face-to-face
contact with members of staff.
E. Ideal authentication
As part of the second round of interviews, we asked
participants what an ideal authentication procedure for online
banking would look like – we now analyse some of their
answers.
Biometrics. Authentication using biometrics was the most fre-
quently proposed idea. Some participants mentioned it already
in the first interview, before we even asked this question. For
example, P06 (CR,SMS,P), after discussing their struggle with
username, password, and token based authentication, told us:
“If you could be in an ideal world where you
wouldn’t have to use your card reader, type in your
password. . . you know I think, in a few 100 years
from now you’ll just put your finger on a machine
and it reads your fingerprint. Today, it’s slow – you
know fast is good! The faster the better.”
P17 (CR,M,P) also said they would like a camera-based
biometric system, as long as the process would be fast:
“Maybe through the camera, webcam looks at me
and verifies it’s me entering the five-digit code[. . . ]
I would be willing to change my position and stay
still until the scan finishes – I still don’t need to
remember anything. [. . . ] I think 5 seconds or 10
maximum, not beyond 10 seconds – I’d freak out –
I’d prefer to remember.”
Reducing cognitive effort. Six participants emphasised they
would like an authentication system that minimises the need to
remember anything. Seven participants also emphasised they
needed to concentrate to log in. They stressed that especially
when tired or in a rush, they needed to stop what they were
doing and focus. P14 (SMS) stressed they needed to make a
conscious attention switch:
“If I am in a rush, I maybe misspell my surname or
I do not enter the card number correctly. If there’s
any delays, it usually is one of those two. The device
itself, I don’t think I ever had problems with that
stage, it’s always been the first one. I’ll have to
get myself together mentally and let’s say “Focus!
Whatever is in your mind, forget it.”
Reducing physical effort. Participants expressed their de-
sire for an authentication mechanism that would reduce the
physical effort they need to make – by avoiding the need to
enter multiple pieces of information (5 mentions), or to carry
additional devices with them (4).
Fast and simple. Reducing the cognitive and physical burden
would lead to faster and simpler authentication procedures.
In general, participants preferred fewer steps, as some of
them suggested they should be logged in based on their
actions, passively, rather than actively needing to enter their
credentials. For instance, P06 (CR,SMS,P), while suggesting
the use of biometrics, said:
“We have our unique fingerprint no one can repli-
cate at the moment, and you just put your finger on
the screen and that’s it, a one-step process.”
Also note that three participants said they preferred one
bank to another because the login process was faster.
Portable. Two participants also highlighted the need for
“authentication portability.” That is, logins should be for
more than just one system – for example, when using their
fingerprint to access their computer, this should already log
them in to their bank and also to other accounts.
F. Implicit authentication
At the end of the second round of interviews, we also asked
participants about their views on implicit authentication. We
explained, everyday English, how an implicit authentication
mechanism works, that it authenticates users by constantly
monitoring some aspects of their online activity and their
behaviour. We heard two main reservations about this type of
authentication. First, five participants said they system would
need to be highly accurate as they did not want to find them-
selves locked out of their machines. Second, six participants
voiced privacy concerns saying they might find it intrusive and
could feel uncomfortable knowing their behaviour was being
tracked. They also stressed they would want to know who is
storing their data and how it is being used. P10 (CR,M,P)
stressed:
“I could see implicit working but you’ll probably
run to privacy issues about that: Who’s doing the
software? How’s the monitoring done? Who gets the
information from the monitoring? blah blah blah.
That would be the real issue.”
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VI. DIARY RESULTS
As stated in Section IV, 17 participants kept an authenti-
cation diary for an average of 11 days (SD = 4.06), starting
from the day they had their first interview. We obtained a total
of 90 entries, with an average of 5.29 entries per person (range:
1-15, SD = 3.99). Out of 90 events, participants reported
having had problems on 12 occasions (13.3%). The most fre-
quent problems were mistyped credentials with 5 occurrences
and misplaced tokens with 2. The following problems were
mentioned once: wrong memorable answer entered, wrong
sequence of steps when using the token, a forgotten username,
a frozen browser session and a slow Internet connection.
OTP generation. Participant could indicate their satisfaction
with each login event on a five-point scale from “very dissatis-
fied” to “very satisfied”. From the 90 recorded events, 11 were
missing a satisfaction rating. We compared satisfaction ratings
for authentication events with and without OTP generation (30
and 60 events respectively). We found participant satisfaction
was higher when they did not generate an OTP to authenticate
(U = 1119, p < 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test).
Number of credentials required. For each authentication
event, we counted how many pieces of information partici-
pants needed to enter during the authentication process. On
average, each authentication instance required 2.44 pieces of
information, ranging from 1 to 5 (e.g., 5 pieces of information
were: surname, account number, last 4 digits of card, OTP,
PIN for token). We found this quantity and satisfaction were
negatively correlated (ρ = −0.48, p < 0.001): the more pieces
of information were needed, the lower participant satisfaction
was.
Time of day. We divided the events in four times of the day:
morning (6am-12pm), afternoon (12pm-6pm), evening (6pm-
12am) and night (12am-6am). We found 24 events took place
in the morning, 32 in the afternoon, 30 in the evening, and 4
during the night. We noticed that morning events had a higher
satisfaction score than events at other times of the day (4.51
vs. 4.07), and found this difference statistically significant
(U = 978, p < 0.01, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). We also
checked whether participants were more likely to encounter
authentication problems in the evening (as opposed to during
the rest of the day): participants experienced 8 problems out of
the 30 authentication events occurring in the evening versus 4
problems out of the 60 events during the rest of the day. Note
that this difference is statistically significant (p = 0.0175, two-
tailed Fisher’s exact test).
Type of hardware token. We also compared satisfaction
levels for banks using two different types of hardware to-
kens: events with banks using a card reader had significantly
higher satisfaction than events with banks using Secure Key
(U = 203, p = 0.001, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test).
VII. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This paper presented an in-depth user study of the usability
of two-factor authentication (2FA) in the context of online
banking. We focused on UK banks and their use of 2FA
for website login, payment setup, and login onto smartphone
apps. We conducted two series of semi-structured interviews,
collected entries from an authentication diary over an average
of 11 days, and analysed data both qualitatively and quantita-
tively.
Summary of findings. Participants reported using 2FA with-
out too many mistakes or lockouts, which is not very surprising
as we deliberately recruited customers accustomed to 2FA and
online banking. On the other hand, we uncovered a number
of issues with credentials in general and, in particular, with
hardware tokens. The demands placed on users, such as the
need to produce and remember a wide range of different
credentials (often with confusing nomenclatures), or having
to carry around and operate extra devices, actually shape how
often, from where, and how, customers use online banking.
Interviews, as well as the analysis of authentication diaries,
showed that participants’ satisfaction dropped when they had
to provide multiple pieces of information and, above all, use
hardware tokens. Several users were not happy with these as
they could not automate the authentication process and were
disrupted from their primary task (e.g., by having to stop and
think about what to do next). One participant actually switched
banks to avoid having to use hardware tokens.
Several participants proposed biometric-based authentica-
tion as an ideal solution that would require less effort (nothing
to carry or to remember). Implicit authentication was also a
well-received idea, but participants stressed it would need to
be highly accurate and respectful of their privacy. Participants
asserted, on several occasions, they knew what kind of level
of security was required for them and took measures to obtain
it. If participants found that their memorable answer was
easy to guess, they used a password instead. They also found
authentication procedures to be excessive compared to offline
transactions where only a four-digit PIN is needed to authorise
a card payment.
Recommendations. We found that reducing the number of
steps required for online banking authentication was crucial
for our participants. For most of them, an ideal authentication
process would involve fewer steps and would not require
them to carry tokens. This highlights the need to reduce the
number of steps throughout the authentication process, and to
minimise the use of the hardware token. As participants have
different capabilities, needs and preferences, banks should
provide customers with a choice of which 2FA method they
can use. For instance, they could let them optionally replace
hardware tokens with codes received via SMS or generated
by a smartphone app, and/or restrict their use to setting up
payments above a certain threshold.
Our study also yields a few immediately actionable sugges-
tions. In order to minimise confusion, UK banks should unify
the wording for credentials (which now includes password,
passcode, passphrase, memorable word, memorable informa-
tion, etc.). The use of different authentication terminology by
each bank was a particular burden for participants who had
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accounts with more than one bank (16/21 in our sample). This
highlights the need for banks to not consider their authenti-
cation in isolation, but the actual tasks and contexts of use
that their customers face, and how design of the mechanism
impacts the lived experience of their customers. We also argue
that banks should remove features that do not add any real
security but actually negatively affect the user experience
by increasing disruption or time needed to authenticate. For
instance, some banks, aiming to thwart key-looking attacks,
force users to enter selected password characters by choosing
from drop-down menus, however, this is cumbersome for
many users and not really effective as one can still type
the corresponding characters from the keyboard. (Also the
characters are not hidden once they are selected from the
menu, which makes them more vulnerable to shoulder surfing.)
Study limitations. Our sample (21 participants) is small and
consists of well-educated, relatively young individuals - this is
representative of those who currently adopt online banking, but
also an ‘easy’ user group. Given that this group of participants
struggled, it is likely that older, less technology-savvy user
groups are put off online banking by the lack of usability
which is an accessibility issue, but also a missed commercial
opportunity for banks looking to lower transaction costs. We
mostly rely on self-reported data, which might be subject
to exaggeration, selective memory, or social desirability. The
findings from our study can be tested in a future, larger online
study. Objective empirical data about success and failure,
password resets, and customers leaving can only be obtained
from the banks themselves, who so far have been hiding
behind “commercial sensitivity” arguments.
Future work. Our work paves the way to several possible
follow-up studies. Besides designing a larger, confirmatory
study, we also plan to conduct statistical analysis to empirically
compare usability across different 2FA technologies for online
banking. To this end, we are working on a privacy-preserving
infrastructure geared to collect data measuring authentication
task’s completion time, mistakes, lockouts, stress, frustration
etc. We also hope that future research, based on our initial
findings, will work on redesigning interfaces, technologies,
and interactions to improve user experience and satisfaction
with online banking authentication.
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